The relationship of international law and domestic law in our constitution - de lege ferenda by Bodnár, László
LÁSZLÓ BODNÁR 
The Relationship of International Law and 
Domestic Law in Our Constitution - 
de lege ferenda 
Introduction 
As a political decision has been made about a new constitution to be accepted in 
1995 (96), another issue arises which has to be dealt with constitutionally, namely what 
place the norms of international law (both the rules of customary law and the rules of 
treaty) take in the Hungarian legal order.' 
This question has to be answered inevitably at the constitutional level for two 
reasons: 
The theoretical and dogmatic debate of "monism or dualism", dating from more 
than a hundred years ago, has become an everyday, practical issue for every state with a 
well-developed legal order and extensive international relations by the second part of the 
20th century — and especially by the last 2-3 decades of the century (millennium). In this 
period it is hardly possible that a state which refrains from co-operating with other states 
can operate efficiently. Under normal circumstances states cannot act in such a way both 
for political and economic reasons. In other words the operating state mechanism is part 
of an international interdependence and the position of a given state in the international 
order of relations is — among others — a legal issue. 
It is a legal issue, in which the state — typically in the constitution (or in an act 
with constitution's force) — determines how and according to what values it accepts its 
international obligations in its own national legal order. 
This latter "obligation" is especially important for the states of Europe, ás with 
respect to these states a more developed (and at the same time a more precise) regulation 
and a stricter protection of human rights have evolved compared both with the rules of 
universal international law and with other regional, international systems of regulation. 
Almost simultaneously with this a process of (economic) integration has arisen 
among the states of Western Europe, the system of which is undergoing the 
simultaneous intensification and extension of integration at present. The latter one, that 
1 The author's private remark: in order to have time for the thorough professional (and political) 
preparation and discussion of the draft of the constitution, it is inexpedient to hurry the passing of the new 
constitution by the Parliament. If preparation has been duly accomplished, the 1100th anniversary of the 
Hungarian conquest may be an appropriate occasion to promulgate the new constitution (possibly in 
Ópusztaszer). 
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is the process of extension affects the political, economic and social perspectives of the 
Republic of Hungary fundamentally, and it is hardly necessary to emphasize that the 
only alternative for Hungary is to join — as soon as possible — the European Union (EU). 
The analysis of the economic, political and social conditions of joining is not the 
jurists' task. However, it is their task to emphasize strongly: the question of "monism or 
dualism" cannot be asked in the European Union. The reason is that in the European 
Union the condition of membership (or in other words existence) is to acknowledge that 
the legal norms of the European Union, both the primary and the secondary sources of 
law are to be applied directly in each and every member-state, concerning both the state 
and the natural and legal persons, and they are given unconditional priority over the 
norms of national, that is domestic law. 
The situation is essentially the same with respect to international treaties 
concluded under the aegis of the Council of Europe (CE) — above all to protect human 
rights (fundamental rights) — as none of the EC members can avoid conforming to e.g. 
the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms by virtue of saying that as a state representing the dualistic concept it has not 
transformed the treaty into domestic law. 
However, in addition to the "severity" of European regionality, one can also see 
that essential changes have occurred at the universal level of international 
law/international relations for the last one or two decades. Just to mention the most 
typical examples: the military action taken against Iraq and the embargo on (Small)-
Yugoslavia prove that member states (and even non-member states) were compelled to 
adhere unconditionally to the sanctions, as international acts, ordered by the UNO 
(Security Council). In these instances none of the states can (could) claim that the 
resolution of the UNO (SC) had not been incorporated — by means of transformation — 
into its own national (domestic) legal order. (NB. The fact that e.g. the resolútions of the 
UNO SC imposing sanctions against (Small)-Yugoslavia were promulgated in a decree 
of the government in Hungary did not entitle the Republic of Hungary to apply its 
higher-level rules of law (acts) over the UNO SC resolution promulgated in the decree 
of the government.) 
Based on the above circumstances and in view of the limits of content of the 
present study, I do not wish to engage in a detailed discussion of the issue of 
"dualism/transformation" or "monism/adoption" either • now or subsequently, 2 I will 
restrict myself only to its summary later on. 
I. The Hungarian constitution and international law in the changing (especially 
European) world 
1. Antecedents 
Until 23rd October, 1989 the Hungarian constitution never included any kind of 
directions on the application of the norms of international law within the state (that is on 
the relationship of international law and domestic law), the relationship of international 
law (international treaties) and the Hungarian legal order was determined only by the 
2 For the detailed discussion see Bodnár, L.: A nemzetközi szerződések és az állam. Budapest 1987, 
p. 276 (See particularly pp. 15-52 and 88-115). 
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general and accepted judicial practice — without being questioned seriously — by 
applying international treaties (over the Hungarian law) only exceptionally and not even 
consistently.3 
Our constitutions —.both the "thousand-year-old" (unwritten) and the first written 
("socialist") constitutions — did not deal with this issue. 
The law-making (and applying of law) during the period between the two World 
Wars as well as between 1945/49 and 1989 considered it natural that international 
treaties concluded by Hungary had to be incorporated in acts (or domestic legal rules of 
law of another level), and that these acts (or other rules of law) had to be promulgated in 
the official paper as all the other (domestic legal) rules of law in order to ensure their 
domestic legal (judicial) applicability. Let me remark, however, that it was almost 
inconceivable, especially during the period of 1949-1989, that reference to international 
treaties providing subject rights for natural persons could be successful in national law-
applying (judicial) organs. 
When reference was made to such rules of law promulgating international treaties 
— which happened very rarely in judicial practice — it was always the act promulgating 
the international treaty which could be referred to, and not the international treaty itself, 
as the original source of law. 
Based on this the conclusion can be drawn that the practical application of the 
very pronounced, classic . theory of dualism/transformation was recognized in the 
Hungarian constitutionality, legislation and jurisdiction.4 
Our first written constitution — Act XX. of 1949 — is one of the East European, 
Soviet-type constitutions, and as such it reflects the "socialist" (Soviet) concept of that 
time, which did not recognize the norms of international law in the domestic sphere 
without the sovereign approval, that is the special decision of the state (that is without its 
transformation into domestic law). This political (legislative) approach ' was duly 
supported by the jurisprudence of that time. 5 
This official concept (and practice), taken by Hungary too, — strangely and 
unfortunately — prevailed in the 70s and 80s as well, although some East European 
countries (even the ones which had "a much stricter political system than Hungary, such 
as e.g. the GDR, the Soviet Union, Romania) had already given up, _ at least formally, 
this rigid approach to the relation of international law and domestic law. In Hungary it 
was only jurisprudence, especially that of 'international law, on whose part an ever-
increasing, professionally supported claim arose to take another (that is a 
monistic/adoptional) approach. 6 . 
3 In the field of criminal law/law of criminal procedure (extradition) or e.g. in the cases related to the 
international transport of goods bilateral or particular conventions were applied by the Hungarian courts, but 
neither e.g. the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights or the ILO convention prohibiting 
women's night work (before being cancelled), and not even the act •or law decree promulating them 
constituted enforceable subject rights for the individual in court during the past years. 
4 See the discussion of this by Triepel and Anzilotti. Cf. Triepel, H.: Völkerrecht and Landesrecht, 
Leipzig, 1899; Anzilotti, D.: Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, Berlin and Leipzig, 1929. 
5 Thus e.g. György Haraszti propagates the (moderate) dualistic concept of the relation of 
international law and domestic law even in the university textbook published in 1976, and as János Bruhács 
states: in the 60s the dualistic concept was prevailing in the Hungarian jurisprudence of international law. Cf. 
Haraszti, Gy: Herczegh, G—Nagy, K.: Nemzetközi jog (Ed. by Haraszti, Gy.), Bp. 1976, pp. 27-29; and 
János Bruhács: A nemzetközi jog és a belső jog viszonya. In: Magyar Jog 1973 (10), p. 700. 
6 See particularly Nagy, K., Valki, L., Bodnúr, L. Cf. Nagy, K.: A nemzetközi jog jogrendszerbeli 
helyének és tagozódásának néhány kérdése a jog általános fogalmának tükrében. In: Jogtudományi Közlöny 
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It is very characteristic of the "backward" Hungarian conditions existing in this 
field of law-making/law-applying that until 26th November, 1982 (that is until the 
passing of Law Decree No. 27 of 1982) there was no rule of law on the conclusion, 
promulgation and/or publication of international treaties with Hungarian participation, 
or on the global relation of international law and the Hungarian legal order.? 
The — extremely minor — amendment of our effective constitution on 23rd 
October, 1989 meant the first, by no means very great step towards "settling" the issue 
of the relation of international law and (the Hungarian) domestic law, the application of 
international legal obligations within the state. According to this: 
"The legal order of the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized 
rules of international law, and ensures the harmony of the undertaken international legal 
obligations and domestic law [Constitution, Sect. (1) of S 7]. 
The direction of our constitution quoted above is prima vista too general (and 
accordingly incomplete) and eclectic: 
it is too general, because its direction concerning international treaties does 
not say anything essential (either on a dualistic or monistic basis) about the position of 
international treaties in (the Hungarian) legal order, about the question of priority, the 
possibility of direct applicability (or the obligation thereof) or about resolving (possible) 
collisions with the (Hungarian) national legal order. Thus the generality of this direction 
— also — implies its incompleteness. 
it is eclectic because the generally recognized norms and principles of 
international law (that is the rules of customary universal international law) are received 
into the Hungarian national legal order, while the law of the treaty is not. 
However, in addition to this — in my opinion basic — paradox I have to remark 
that it is conceptual nonsense to view this reception (which is nothing else than the 
intention of receiving on the state's part) as a general transformation. The reason for this 
is that one cannot transform a norm which is far from being exact, and which often 
necessitates a concrete interpretation of case so as to determine the content of the norm 
even in international jurisdiction (or in other international application of law). 8 
On the other hand, however, if the first expression of Section (1) of S 7. of our 
constitution is interpreted not as a "general transformation" but as the adoption of the 
rules of customary law, then the content of the norms of customary law determined by 
the national (in this case by the Hungarian) jurisdiction can only be a unilateral 
domestic interpretation.9 (The content of international treaties — as written sources of 
law — is usually exact enough for the unilateral domestic interpretation to be adequate to 
the authentic, that is to the law-making interpretation.) 
1972. (1-2), pp. 39-49. See particularly pp. 43 and 45. Valki, L.: A nemzetközi jog sajátos társadalmi 
természete, Bp. 1981. p. 35. Bodnár, L.: A nemzetközi jog és az államon belüli jog viszonya — egyes államok 
alkotmányai alapján. Acta Jur. et Pol. Szeged, Tom XXV. Fasc. 1. 
7 Before Law Decree No. 27 of 1982 was passed, this problem was "regulated" only by the KüM—IM 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Ministry of Justice) Press Release ("A Külügyminisztérium és az Igazságügyi 
Minisztérium tájékoztatója a nemzetközi szerződések megkötéséhez"), which can hardly be regarded as a 
source of law. 
8 In this sense see Muller, J.P.—Wildhaber, L.: Praxis des Völkerrecht, Bern 1977, p. 134; 
Seidl—Hovenveldern, I.: Transfromation or Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law. In: 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1963, pp. 93-94; Ühlinger, Th.: Der völkerrechtliche Vertrag 
im staatlichen Recht, Vienna—New York 1973, p. 151. 
9 Cf. Haraszti, Gy.: A nemzetközi szerződések értelmezésének alapvető kérdései, Bp. 1965, pp. 
111-120. 
114 
However, the main theoretical/dogmatic paradox lies undoubtedly in the fact that 
the two different constructions, which are in total contrast, cannot be accounted for 
correctly with respect to the rules of customary law or international treaties. 
Consequently it is not accidental that strong criticism has been voiced against such 
duality found in the German Constitution [GG Section 25 and GG (1) II. 59.]. 10 In the 
Federal Republic of Germany this contradiction manifested in the constitution is further 
sharpened by the fact that as the result of the EU membership of the FRG the EU treaties 
(as well as the secondary sources of law) are applied directly, without transformation — 
in accordance with the EU obligations — in the FRG, without the naturalness of this 
being questioned. 11 
2. Is it necessary to regulate the relation of international law (customary law + 
treaties) and the national (Hungarian) law in an exact way in our new constitution? 
In my opinion there is only one answer to this question: by all means! The 
reasons for this categorical answer are the following: 
The most important and at the same time the most general reason is that — as 
our effective constitution states it, too — the Republic of Hungary is a constitutional 
state. (It is hardly necessary to give reasons for the importance of constitutionality as a 
basic constitutional value, for it is the fundamental condition of not only our joining the 
European Union and of our already granted membership in the European Council, but 
also of belonging to the Európean civilization.) 
On the other hand the inherent attribute of constitutionality is not only to subject 
the state to the regulations of the constitution and the laws (as regards the domestic legal 
order), but also to fulfil international legal obligations in good faith — including their 
application within the state — that is to ensure the subject rights originating therefrom. 12 
In all probability it is not pure chance that almost all the traditional 
(bourgeois) democracies considered it important to settle the issue of the relation of 
international law and domestic law. It was typically regulated in their constitutions, 13 or 
— in the absence of this — an accepted judicial practice had evolved, which was 
considered to be a natural, unquestionable conception complying with 
constitution(ality). 14 
Following the example of the oldest (bourgeois) democracies (the Netherlands, 
the USA, France, Switzerland), West European states which became democratized later 
10 See particularly Partsch, K.J.: Die Anwendung des Völkerrechts im innerstaatlichen Recht. 
Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, Karlsruhe, 1964, p. 101; Bleckmann, A.: Grundgesetz 
and Völkerrecht, Berlin, 1975, p. 279. 
11 An absolute exception is the so-called "Solange (I—II) Beschlua" resolution of the constitutional 
court — subject to much criticism and debate — in which the German constitutional court stubbornly insisted 
on the application of German law instead of the European Community law because at that time the German 
law gave more protection to the individuals as regards fundamental rights than community law. For more 
details on the criticism and the debate see e.g. Rupp, H. H.: Grundrechtsschutz in den Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften. In: Die Grundrechte in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft. Baden-Baden 1978, pp. 9-21. For 
the different viewpoints see op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
12 Article 27. of the Vienna Convention of 1969 codifying the law of international treaties states: 
"neither party can refer to the directions of its domestic law to justify the failure of the execution of the 
treaty..." 
13 Cf. Article 55 of the French Constitution, Article 66 of the Dutch Constitution, Section (2) of 
Article VI. of the Constitution of the USA. 
14 This is the situation in Switzerland. Cf. Müller, J.P.—Wildhaber, L.: op. cit., p. 134. 
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(Austria, and even later Spain, Portugal, Turkey) also recognize the priority and direct 
applicability of the norms of international law over domestic law. 15 
But even in those West European states in which the system of 
dualism/transformation has been maintained, the international treaties transformed into 
domestic law (now as acts) are given priority over the "ordinary" acts, either in 
conformity with the regulation of the constitution (as e.g. in the FRG and in Greece) or 
due to the "compulsion" of belonging to Europe (see the Scandinavian states). 16 
Now that the Scandinavian states have been mentioned, a special — and now very 
short — remark should be made. Namely that the Scandinavian legal orders are not really 
continental legal orders, the Anglo-Saxon influence (that is the British influence) is 
almost as dominant in them as the "continental" influencej 17 Accordingly, the 
Scandinavian concept (and practice) of the relation of international law and domestic 
law is based on the British law. It is true, however, that the membership itself in the 
Council of Europe has already forced the revision of the British legal concept serving as 
a "model" (at least with respect to international treaties). 18 
c) In view of the above — it seems that — it is not unnecessary to quote the new 
European constitutions of the last two decades. At least two basic conclusions can be 
drawn from them — even without a thorough analysis: 
ca) The new constitutions — without exception, although to a different extent — 
considered it important to determine the relation of international law and national law in 
the constitution. 
cb) The great majority of the new constitutions generally recognize the priority of 
international law (international treaties) over the state's own acts (excluding the 
constitution). 
The most recent constitutions of Western Europe contain, the following major 
directions about the relation of international law and domestic law: 
Greece, the constitution of 1975 (Section 1 of Article 28): 
"The generally accepted rules of international law, as well as international 
treaties, after they have been enacted and have come into force, shall become the 
integral part of Greek domestic law, each to its own expression, and are to be applied 
over any conflicting legal measures." 
15 The "priority" of international treaties — in contrast with the term "primacy" used by Kelsen — 
does not imply a subordinate — superordinate relation between international law and domestic law. The 
priority of the norms of international law means only that if there is collision between the norms of 
international law and domestic law — which, after all, have been created by the same law-making body 
(bodies) of the state —, the norm of international law is given priority. 
16 Cf. FRG GG. Article 59, Greek Constitution, Section (1) of Article 28. The Scandinavian states 
had traditionally adopted the concept and practice of dualism, which was undermined by the application of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and in the 80s the direct judicial application of the directions of 
this convention became the natural part of judicial practice. Cf. Jensen, S. S.: The European Convention on 
Human Rights in Scandinavian Law. Jurist-og Ökonomforbundets Forlag. 1992. See particularly pp. 4-7 and 
40-72. 
17 In this sence e.g. Strömholm In: An Introduction to Swedish Law. Vol.I. (Ed. by Stig Strömholm) 
Deventer The Netherlands, Boston—Antwerpen—Frankfurt, 1981, pp. 32-33. 1 8 In Denmark and Norway it is clearly established that administrative authorities are under a legal 
obligation to exercise their discretionary powers in accordance with international obligations undertaken — be 
they incorporated or not — whereas in contemporary Swedish law there seems to be only a tendency to 
recognize such obligations." Jensen, S. S.: op. cit., p. 174. (Since Sweden is the member of the European 
Union as of 1st January, 1995, the rules of law of the EU are to be applied directly, preceding Swedish law in 
Sweden, too. — L.B.) 
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Portugal, the constitution of 1975 (Article 8): 
"1. The norms and the principles of general or common international law 
constitute the integral part of Portuguese law. 
2. The duly ratified or accepted general norms of international treaties shall 
become part of the domestic legal order after they have been published officially and if 
the Portuguese State has joined them internationally." 
Spain, the constitution of 1978 [Section (1) of Article 96]: 
"The validly concluded international treaties, provided they have been published 
officially in Spain, constitute part of the national legal order. The provisions thereof can 
be repealed, amended or suspended only in the manner determined in the treaty itself or 
according to the generally recognized rules of international law." 
Turkey, the constitution of 1982, (Exp. 5 of Article 9): 
"International treaties which have been duly entered into force have the force of 
law. Therefore the Constitutional Court cannot be appealed to on the grounds of 
violating the Constitution." 
Three of the above four new West European constitutions (Portuguese, Spanish, 
Turkish) provide for the relation of international law and domestic law on the basis of 
the concept of monism/adoption, and only the Greek constitution represents the practice 
of dualism/transformation. It is noteworthy, however, that the Greek constitution also 
states that the acts promulgating the treaties transformed into domestic law have 
priority over all the other legal acts. 
The majority of East European states which have undergone a democratic 
transformation, or East European democratic states which have become independent 
recently, have accepted a new constitution almost immediately — although obviously for 
different reasons. (Thus Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania.) 
Poland and Hungary opted for another way: Poland passed an act with 
constitution' force (in fact a constitution's novel — L.B.). On 17th October, 1992 "On the 
mutual relations of the legislative and executive bodies of the Republic of Poland and on 
the local authorities" "With the aim of improving the operation of the highest-level 
bodies of the Republic of Poland until its new Constitution is accepted..." (The author's 
own emphasis.) 
In Hungary the amendment of the constitution of 23rd October, 1989 (Act XXXI 
of 1989) essentially signified the general revision of the constitution, and it was then that 
the above quoted Section (1) of § 7. was included in our constitution, which — in spite of 
its defects — can be regarded as a milestone in constitutional history, as it was the first 
time that the Hungarian constitution mentioned the relation of international law 
(international treaties) and the Hungarian legal order. 
With the amendment of the constitution of 1989 the fundamentals of the 
democratic system had become part of the constitution. Several further partial 
amendments to the constitution and (in some cases) related legislative acts were made, 
partly simultaneously with this and partly later, in order to extend democratic 
constitutionality . 
Thus the common feature of the Polish and the Hungarian constitutional 
processes (following the change of the regime) is that they both intend to accept the new 
constitution in a later system of politics/power which — compared to the period of the 
change of the regime — is more settled, more tranquil and more stable. 
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Let us see now how the already accepted East European constitutions regulate the 
relation of international law and domestic law: 
The Federation of Russia, constitution of 1993 [Section (4) of Article 15]: 
"The generally recognized principles and rules of international law and the 
international treaties of the Federation of Russia are the constituents of its legal order. If 
the international treaty of the Federation of Russia states rules other than ordained by the 
act, the rules of the international treaty shall be applied." 
The Republic of Lithuania, constitution of 1992 [Section (3) of S 138]: 
"The international treaties ratified by the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania 
constitute the integral part of the legal order of the Republic of Lithuania." 
The Republic of Estonia, constitution of 1992, second exp. of Section (1) of 
Article 3, and Section (2) of Article 123): 
"The universally recognized principles and norms of international law constitute 
the inseparable part of the Estonian legal order." 
"If the Estonian acts or other decrees are in contradiction with the international 
treaties ratified by the Parliament, the relevant articles of the international treaties shall 
be applied." 
The Republic of Slovenia, constitution of 1991, (Article 8): 
"The acts and the other regulations have to be in harmony with the generally 
effective principles of international law and with the international treaties binding 
Slovenia. The ratified and published international treaties are to be applied directly." 
The Republic of Croatia, constitution of 1990, (Article 134): 
"The international legal conventions, which have been concluded, confirmed in 
conformity with the constitution and published, constitute the part of the domestic legal 
order of the Republic, and as to their application they are superior to the acts. Their 
provisions can be repealed or amended only on the condition and in the manner 
determined by them, or according to the general basic principles of international law. 
The Republic of Bulgaria, constitution of 1991 [Section (4) of Article 5 and 
Section (3) of Article 85]: 
"Every international deed which has been ratified, promulgated and entered into 
force in the constitutionally specified manner with respect to the Republic of Bulgaria 
shall be deemed to be the part of the national legislation of the country. The deed shall 
replace any national act regulating otherwise." 
"The ratification of an international treaty which necessitates the amendment of 
the Constitution has to be preceded by passing the relevant amendment to the 
constitution." 
Romania, constitution of 1991 [Section (1) and (2) of 5 11]: 
"(1) The Romanian state obliges itself to fulfil, consistently and in good faith, its 
obligations imposed on itself by the treaties signed by the state. 
(2) The treaties which have been duly ratified by the Parliament constitute part of 
the national law." 
The Czech Republic, constitution of 1992 (Article 10): 
"The ratified and promulgated international treaties on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, which treaties are binding on the Czech Republic, shall be 
directly compulsory and shall have priority over the acts." 
The Republic of Slovakia, constitution of 1992 [Article 11, Section (e) of Article 
125 and Section (2) of Article 144]: 
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"The international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms, which 
have been ratified by the Republic of Slovakia and have been promulgated in the manner 
prescribed by the law, are given priority over the acts of the Republic of Slovakia if they 
guarantee the extension of constitutional rights and freedoms." 
The Constitutional Court shall decide whether "the generally binding legal rules 
are in harmony with the international treaties which have been promulgated in the 
manner prescribed for the promulgation of acts." 
"If the constitution or the act states so, the international treaties shall be binding 
on the judges, too." 
Finally, to satisfy the need of precise documentation: 
the act with constitution's force of 1992 of the Republic of Poland [Section (2) of 
28, and Section (1) and (2) of S 33; effective until the new constitution is accepted]: 
"The President of the Republic (...) shall see to the observation of international 
treaties." 
"(1) The President of the Republic shall confirm and dissolve international 
treaties, of which he has to notify the Szejm and the Senate. 
(2) The confirmation or dissolution of international treaties which concern state 
borders or defence alliances, or impose financial obligations on the state, or necessitate 
changes in the act, require legislative authorization." 19 
The regulations contained in the above quoted East European constitutions lead 
to the following conclusions: 
With respect to the regulation of the relation of international law (international 
treaties) and domestic law, the constitution of the Federation of Russia is modelled on 
the concept of the relevant act of the former Soviet Union, 20 but at the same time this 
relation is further improved and made unequivocal according to the most characteristic 
concept of monism/adoption. One must emphasize the fact that Russia — in contrast with 
the former Soviet Union — regulated this issue in its constitution, in a separate chapter 
thereof. 
In the case of Lithuania and Estonia — by virtue of their characteristic historical 
situation — it was the first time they had the opportunity to regulate the relation of their 
national legal order to international law comprehensively, at the constitutional level, as 
independent states. 
One can say that both constitutions accepted the progressive bourgeois 
democratic traditions and the relevant concept of the majority of the new West European 
democracies. The constitutions of both Baltic states are based on the concept (the 
Lithuanian constitution implicitly) that the international treaties which have been 
ratified and published (by the Parliament) form part of their national legal order, are to 
be applied directly and have priority over the ("ordinary") acts. 
However, as to the position within the constitution a difference, which is more 
than a mere structural difference, can be observed in the constitutions of these two newly 
independent Baltic states. Although both constitutions regulate the relation of 
international treaties and domestic law in a separate chapter, the Estonian constitution 
also provides for the "generally recognized principles and rules of international law" 
20 See the text of the act in: Ezsegodnik mersdunarodnogo prava, 1978, Moscow, 1980, pp. 
435-439. 
19 The quoted texts of the constitutions are not authentic translations. 
119 
separately, in Chapter I entitled "General regulations", while the Lithuanian constitution 
makes no reference to this whatsoever. 
Slovenia and Croatia, which won their independence by separating from the 
(former) Yugoslavian Socialist Republic, modelled the constitutional regulation of the 
relation of their national legal order and international law (international treaties) not 
only on the concept and experience of the constitutional system of the European 
(bourgeois) democracies but also on the constitution of their predecessor state, the 
federal Yugoslavian Socialist Republic (YSR). Section 210 of the 1974 constitution of 
the YSR stated that "the published international treaties shall be applied directly by the 
courts." 
Compared to this, the two former Yugoslavian member states limited the direct 
applicability of international treaties and their priority over the acts inasmuch as this 
status is recognized only in the case of ratified (and published) international treaties. 
Otherwise the comparison of the Slovenian and Croatian constitutions — which 
are essentially the same in content — raises only one (although not negligible) question as 
regards position: namely whether or not the constitutional norms of the same content 
have a special relevance in view of the fact that — as in this case — the given norm is 
included in the separate (relevant) chapter of the constitution (Chapter VII: of the 
Croatian constitution on the "International legal relations") or in the — typically first — 
chapter determining the general regulations of the constitution (in other words the 
fundamentals of constitutional order) (Slovenian constitution: Chapter I.: "General 
regulations", and similarly: Russian constitution, Part I., Chapter I.: "The fundamentals 
of constitutional order"). 
The new constitution of Bulgaria — compared to the previous constitution, which 
did not regulate the application of international treaties within the state — radically 
overstepped the former "socialist Bulgarian" concept, when for the regulation of the 
relation of international treaties and domestic law it accepted the constitutional 
regulation which suits democratic constitutionality the best. It is stated in Chapter I. of 
the constitution, among the "Basic principles", that international treaties which have 
been constitutionally ratified, promulgated and entered into force form part of the 
legislation and replace any other national act regulating otherwise. 21 
A natural exception to this is the ratification of international treaties requiring the 
amendment of the constitution, as in such cases the prerequisite of ratification is the 
previous amendment of the constitution. 22 
The recognition of the (generally accepted) principles and norms of international 
law — in the field of foreign policy — is also regulated in Chapter I., but quite strangely 
and separately from regulations concerning international treaties, only in Section 24, the 
last section of the chapter. 
The new constitution of Romania regulates the relation of international law 
(international treaties) and the Romanian national law with certain antecedents, as the 
former Romanian "socialist" constitution — unlike most of the socialist constitutions of 
that time — also contained certain provisions about the relation of international treaties 
and the Romanian domestic law, stating the priority of international treaties. 23 
21 Cf. Section (4) of Article 5 of the constitution. 
22 Cf. Section (3) of Article 85 of the constitution. 
23 Cf. the Romanian Constitution of 1965: Section (9) of Article 43, Section (3) of Article 63 an 
Section (9) of Article 77. 
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In view of this it is actually surprising that the new Romanian constitution is 
hardly more elaborate in this respect than its "socialist" predecessor, and it is especially 
so if compared to the majority of the new constitutions of the East European countries. 
Although the new Romanian constitution acknowledges, in the "General Principles" 
determined under Title I, that the treaties ratified by the Parliament constitute part of the 
national law,24 priority is mentioned explicitly only in S 20 on "International treaties 
concerning human rights", regulated under Title II (Fundamental rights, freedoms and 
obligations"), and only regarding these treaties. 25 
The constitutions of both the Czech Republic and the Slovakian Republic also 
raise theoretical/dogmatic questions with respect to regulating the relation of 
international law (international treaties) and domestic law — compared with the eclectic 
nature of the Romanian constitution. 
It is well-known that before becoming independent both states were the member 
states of the former (federal) Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic. Their former — 
common — constitution, the Czechoslovakian constitution of 1960 was quite terse on the 
relation of international law and domestic law, in fact it implied the system of 
dualism/transformation. 
At the same time, thanks to the former Czechoslovakian Republic, both states can 
look back on considerable bourgeois democratic experiences — the extent of which is 
quite unusual in Eastern Europe. Thus it makes one think why the constitutions of these 
two new East European democracies are so curt when it comes to regulating the relation 
of international law and domestic law. The fact is that both constitutions keep quiet 
about the global relation of international law (international treaties) and the national 
legal order. 26 
However, both constitutions assert the priority of — ratified and promulgated — 
international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms over the national acts. 
But while the Czech constitution does so in Chapter I. containing the "Basic provisions", 
the Slovakian constitution includes it among the general provisions of the second part on 
"Fundamental rights and freedoms". In addition to this difference in position a further 
difference of content must also be pointed out, namely that the Slovakian constitution 
stipulates further conditions of recognizing the priority of international treaties 
concluded in this field 2 7 
In my opinion the quoted provisions of the new Czech and Slovakian 
constitutions concerning the "definition" of the relation of international law and 
domestic law cannot be interpreted on a theoretical/dogmatic basis. The reason is the 
fact that the priority of international treaties concluded in a single field — that is 
concerning fundamental human rights (and freedoms) — over the national acts is 
recognized at constitutional level without even mentioning the legal status of treaties 
concluded in other fields, which suggests a political consideration at best, but legal 
reasons are hardly conceivable. 
24 Cf. Section (2) of S 11 of the constitution. 
25 Compared to the other new East European constitutions, the new Romanian constitution gives a 
rather disharmonious impression; it seems to the author that current political reasons make the 
legal/institutional system eclectic. 
26 For lack of constitutional regulation the Czech and Slovakian law-appliers are in fact forced to 
take the "Scandinavian way". 
27 Cf. Article 11 of the constitution. 
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The underlying intention is most probably the fact that both states — as members 
of the Council of Europe — are by all means bound to ensure the priority of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. They did so, and only so. And with this they scarcely 
satisfy the criteria of constitutionality — laid down in Section 1. of both constitutions. 
The Polish act with constitution's force — most probably because of its 
provisional nature — does not take a stand on the issue of the global relationship of 
international law (international treaties) and the Polish national legal order. However, 
certain conclusions can be drawn implicitely, e.g. that adherence to the provisions of 
international treaties — in the domestic sphere, too — has to be ensured in some way. This 
is made to be the task of the President of the Republic by the act with constitution's 
force. 
Summarizing conclusions 
All of the already accepted East European constitutions provide for the relation 
of international law and the national legal order in one way or another. 
All the quoted constitutions recognize the priority of international law 
(international treaties) over the acts. 
With respect to whether priority is given to all the international treaties two 
extreme poles can be seen, on the one hand Russia (it covers all the international 
treaties), on the other hand the Czech Republic and Slovakia (it covers only the 
international treaties on human rights). 
The typical construction is the following: the international treaties which have 
been ratified and promulgated/published (by the Parliament) constitute the part of the 
national legal order and have priority (with the exception of the constitution) over all the 
national law-making acts. 
II. How should the relation of international law (international treaties) and the 
Hungarian legal order be regulated in our new constitution? 
1. Without engaging in the detailed discussion of the theoretical/dogmatic 
problems concerning the relation of international law and domestic law, let me give a 
review of the general theories, the applied or possible legal-technical solutions, the basic 
questions of which can be defined as follows: 
The global relation of international law (international treaties) and domestic 
law. 
How does an international treaty become part of the legal order of the state 
(transformation and/or adoption)? 
On what basis can the provisions of an international treaty be applied directly 
in the sphere (of the application) of domestic law? 
Ad a) As to the relation of international law and domestic law, the historical 
conception to appear is the one which is based on the unified legal order but which 
accords primacy to domestic law. This view, which is usually traced back to Hegel, 
namely that international law is in fact the extension of state law, thus it is external state 
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law, was professed by the school of law known as the School of Bonn (Zorn, Wenzel, 
Kaufmann) at the end of the 19th century. 28 
This view, and especially the practical consequences thereof deprived 
international law (international treaties) of its essential attribute; namely that 
international law is the joint law-making of at least two states. If, however, domestic law 
has priority over this, all in all it implies that international obligations can be ignored by 
means of unilateral (domestic) law-making. This doctrine has obviously been made 
insupportable by the development of inter-state relations, and by the emphasis laid on 
the more or less mutual interest inherent in these relations. 
It was the German Triepel who worked out a new construction. In his monograph 
published in 1899, entitled: Völkerrecht and Landesrecht, he expounded an entirely new 
construction of the relation of international law and domestic law, namely the duality of 
the legal order. Accordingly, international law and domestic law were regarded as 
completely independent, co-ordinate legal orders. In his concept the two legal orders can 
be depicted with two circles, which may touch but will never intersect each other, that is 
they are applied separately, in two different domains. 29 
This rigid dualistic concept was disproved by reality just as the concept based on 
the primacy of domestic law also proved to be unviable. Reality definitely proved that 
certain norms of international law do enter and are (may be) applicable in the sphere of 
domestic law. If the dualistic concept is to be maintained, this is possible only by 
admitting that there is some overlapping between the systems of international law and 
domestic law. The explanation of this overlapping is given and expounded by Anzilotti 
in his textbook published in 1929. 30 Anzilotti's concept can be depicted with two circles 
which intersect each other, and the area of intersection is the field which forms part of 
both international law and domestic law. 
As the basic principle and one that characterizes every concept of dualism it can 
be asserted that the norms constituting the "system" of international law can be applied 
in the sphere of domestic law only by way of their transformation. 
Contrary to the doctrines discussed briefly in the foregoing and to the state 
practice based on them, outside Europe, more precisely in the USA, a radically different 
concept has prevailed since the end of the 18th century. The constitution of the United 
States (as early as in its 1789 form) declares that the international treaties concluded by 
the Federation are the most important acts of the USA, they are binding on each 
(member) state and each judge, and they have priority over the acts. This constitutional 
regulation asserts the implicit priority of international treaties, and once they have been 
concluded they automatically become part of the legal order of the state. 31 
In Europe this approach to the relation of international law and domestic law 
became known only in the middle of the 20th century, mostly due to the work and 
activities of the jurists representing the School of Vienna (Kelsen, Verdross, Kunz). 
However, this doctrine, propagated primarily by Kelsen, goes beyond the doctrine and 
28 Cf. Zorn, Ph.: Die deutschen Staatsvertrage. In: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 
Band 36. (1880); Kaufmann, W.: Die Rechtskraft des internationalen Rechts and das Verhültnis der 
Staatsgesetzgebungen and der Staatsorgane zum demselben. Stuttgart, 1899.; Wenzel, A.: Juristische 
Grundprobleme. Vienna 1920. 
29 Cf. Triepel, H.: Völkerrecht and Landesrecht. Leipzig, 1899. (See particularly pp. 111-118.) 
30 Anzilotti, D.: Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts. Berlin and Leipzig, 1929. 
31 Section (2) of Article VI. of the constitution. 
123 
practice which had appeared and been applied in the USA. In Kelsen's concept (as the 
result of the global, normative concept concerning law) international law is given not 
only priority, but also supremacy over domestic law, that is according to his concept 
states can make domestic law only in the domain and to the extent allowed by 
international law.32 
It is evident that on account of the sovereignty of the states this concept could not 
(and did not) become an acceptable concept in practice. Accordingly, in several 
European countries it is essentially the approach taken in the constitution of the USA 
which has become known and accepted, and I am also of the opinion that it is this 
concept and the practice based on it which expresses the relation of international law 
and domestic law correctly, that is the priority of international law (international 
treaties) over the domestic law of the state in the domain of jurisdiction. 
Now I do not wish to go into details of why. 33 From the aspect of practicability it 
can be stated that the actual application of international legal contacts, international 
legal relations is suited the best by this approach. The reason is that until only the states 
were recognized as the subjects of international law, it had no real practical significance 
whether the concept of dualism or monism was predominant. 
However, since it became undeniable that international law may have subjects 
other than the states, and since the international rules of human rights expressed the need 
that the individuals' fundamental rights laid down by international protection should be 
provided in every state, the recognition of the direct applicability of international treaties 
within the state has become an elementary issue and need so that in the case of a 
potential collision the rights provided for individuals (and legal persons) in international 
treaties can be realized effectively. 
Besides, one also has to consider the European trend according to which e.g. the 
"compulsion" of integration itself, manifested in the European Union, asserts the 
necessary condition that all the (primary and major secondary) rules of the Union should 
have priority over the national law of the member states. 
Finally, I would like to give a brief answer for the question why, besides the 
practical reasons, international law (international treaty) is "superior" to the national law 
of the states, that is why the rules of international law are (may be) given priority over 
the national law of the state. 
Actually the answer was already touched upon when discussing why the 
approaches professing the priority of domestic law are insupportable. The point is that 
the international legal norm representing the joint law-making of at least two states — 
which norm is made by the same state bodies with authority for law-making — is superior 
because it can be changed only by the same joint law-making as it was created. The 
values and the constitutional expectations of legal security and constitutionality can be 
ensured only if the application of the obligations undertaken in international treaties is 
ensured by the states in the sphere of domestic law, too. 
Ad b) Basically there are two possibilities for the application of international 
treaties in the sphere of domestic law: 
32 Cf. Kelsen, H.: Principles of International Law. New York 1956. (See particularly p. 94); 
Verdross, A.: Völkerrecht, 4th Edition. Vienna 1959. (See particularly pp. 61-63); Kunz, J.: 
Völkerrechtswissenschaft und reine Rechtslehre, Vienna 1923. (See particularly pp. 80-82.) 
33 For the most detailed discussion in the Hungarian literature of law see Bodnár, L.: A nemzetközi 
szerződések és az állam. Bp. 1987. 
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ba) Some kind of domestic law-making act is necessary to transform 
international treaties into domestic legal norms. This is the practice of transformation, 
which is followed by a considerable number of the states. 
bb) The rules of treaty of international law can be applied directly, automatically 
in the sphere of domestic law, without any concrete domestic legal . act. This is called the 
legal technique of adoption, which is practiced in several European states (e.g. France, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland etc.). 
The concept of transformation appeared simultaneously with the dualistic 
concept of international law and domestic law, or in other words with the appearance of 
Triepel's doctrines. According to this concept the treaty published by the state is binding 
only on the state itself, and it is incorrect to say that obligations are also imposed on the 
subjects of the state through the publication; it is not the treaty but the state norm which 
will bind them.34 
The nature of transformation was expounded by Anzilotti, who stated that the 
manifestation of will on the state's part for reception was necessary before a given norm 
of international law could be applied in the sphere of domestic law. This, in turn, means 
that the addressees of the international legal norm and the source of law itself will 
change (as in the sphere of domestic law the international legal norm will be replaced by 
the domestic legal norm). Morover, the structure of law will also change, the former 
international legal order of co-ordination will be replaced with a subordinate relation. 35 
Thus the principle and technique of transformation embody the practical 
application of the plainest dualistic theory. 
As to the technique of transformation itself, special and general transformation 
can be distinguished. The distinction is based on whether it is some concrete 
international treaty that is transformed into domestic law (special transformation), or the 
general rules of international law (international treaties). According to Menzel-Ipsen this 
distinction is justified by the existence of customary law, as the rules of customary law — 
due to their inherent nature — can be the subjects of general transformation only.36 In my 
opinion this distinction is artificial and formal, as typically the rules of customary law 
cannot be transformed. According to Anzilotti the essential elements of transformation 
(the change of the addressees, the source of law and the structure), supplemented with 
the frequent uncertainty of the content of customary law, make the transformation of 
customary law — typically — inconceivable. 
Besides, another factor of uncertainty has to be considered, namely the one 
concerning the date of "birth" of a given rule of customary law. The reason is that two 
phases can be distinguished in the process of origin of the rules of customary law: a) the 
practical one, which is repeated regularly between the subjects-at-law; and b) the legal 
conviction associated with this practice (opinio iuris). As the exact date of the latter 
phase can hardly be determined, it is impossible to decide whether the transformed 
international "rule of customary law" can really be regarded as a ■ egal norm or only as a 
custom. 
Naturally, in a given stage it will be certain whether a given rule has indisputably 
become customary law. However, the elements of content cannot be determined exactly 
in this case either. As regards the case of delimiting the continental shelf of the North 
36 Menzel, E. — Ipsen, K.: Völkerrecht, 2nd Edition, Munich, 1979, pp. 54-55. 
34 Triepel, H.: op. cit., p. 118. 
35 Anzilotti, D.: op. cit., p. 46. 
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Sea between the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, it was not 
disputed that the institution of the continental shelf had also become the general rule of 
(customary) international law. Certain questions of detail, however, — namely the rules 
of delimitation — had to be judged by the International Court of Justice. 37 
Under such circumstances, however, one cannot say that a certain rule of 
customary international law can be the subject — by means of transformation — of 
domestic law-making. Otherwise domestic legal rules should regulate such questions of 
detail concerning which even the (tacit) consensus between the states does not give 
exact guide-lines. In connection with this the jurisprudence of international law points 
out another important aspect; namely that "the generally recognized rules of 
international law" are not in the least a static concept. 38 
As the classic dualistic concept of law — in the Triepelian sense — can hardly be 
defended any longer, the natural conclusion arises that the reason for the existence of the 
corresponding legal technique of transformation cannot be defended either. Yet 
advocates of transformation or dualism adduce the not negligible counter-argument that 
after all it is always the domestic state bodies and the constitutions which will decide 
whether a given rule of international law (either customary law or the law of treaty) can 
be applied in the sphere of domestic law. 
Undoubtedly, there is always some state act involved in determining under what 
conditions, if at all, the rule of international law can be applied in domestic law. 
This kind of state act is certainly present in the case of the legal technique of 
adoption, too. The technique of adoption essentially means the appearance of a general 
clause, when it is declared by a single domestic — typically constitutional — regulation of 
the state that the international law of the state is also part of the legal order of the state. 
The unified legal order declared in this way — including the norms of both international 
law and domestic law — makes transformation conceptually unnecessary. The reason 
being that the norms of international law constituting part of the state's own legal order 
will be applied by the state in the sphere of (the application of) domestic law. An 
existing, perfect, valid (international) legal norm. Consequently the essence of the matter 
will be disregarded if the relation of international law and domestic law is approached 
from the possibilities and methods of how the norms of international law can become the 
norms of domestic law. The norms of international law do not become the part of 
domestic law, they constitute the part of the state's (unified) own legal order right from 
the beginning. Accordingly, the case is not the application of the norms of international 
origin as domestic legal rules, but the application thereof as international legal rules in 
the domestic sphere. 
In addition to the theoretical considerations, the theory of transformation has a 
vulnerable point from practical aspects, too. Namely: why is only the transformation of 
treaties considered necessary? The evident reason is that the norms of customary law 
cannot be transformed. Muller and Wildhaber both pointed out that the application of 
the rules of customary international law in the domestic sphere — due to the nature of the 
matter — is possible only by means of adoption. 39 They cannot be transformed, but on 
37 For the case description in the Hungarian language see Lamm, V.: A hágai Nemzetközi Biróság 
döntései 1957-1982. Bp. 1984, pp. 162-173. 
38 In this sense see Seidl—Hohenveldern: Transformation or Adoption of International into 
Municipal Law? In: International Law Quarterly, 1963, pp. 93-94. 
39 Cf. Muller, J.P. — Wildhaber, L.: Praxis des Völkerrechts. Bern, 1977, p. 134. 
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the other hand none of the states can refuse the application of the norms of customary 
law on these grounds. 
The situation is different with treaties, of course. Transformation has no legal-
technical obstacles, thus this technique is used by many states. Even such states do so 
which, otherwise, recognize the direct applicability of the general rules of (customary) 
international law within the state (e.g. the FRG, Greece). At the same time these states 
also recognize it implicitly — through their mixed practice — that the necessity of 
transformation is not an inherent feature of international law, as the norms of 
international law can be applied directly in the sphere of domestic law. 
One thing for sure is that international law has no such rule which prescribes the 
obligation of transformation. This statement seems to be formally contradicted by the 
fact that certain international treaties (e.g. the genocide convention, or treaties 
concerning the safety of civilian air transport) compel the states to make (domestic) 
laws. However, this is by mo means a real transformation. It only means that the 
fulfilment of a certain international legal obligation undertaken in the given international 
treaty is realized by a certain law made by the state. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the problems — which I have also criticized — of 
the dualistic doctrine and from the legal technique of transformation based on this is the 
following: the requirements of our age can be best met by the system of adoption, which 
is based on the unified system of international law and domestic law, and which makes 
it possible to apply the norms of international law within the state directly. This 
approach and legal technique is especially prominent as regards international treaties 
creating direct rights for the individuals (legal persons), too; such as e.g. human rights, 
the protection of ethnic-national minorities, conventions on double taxation, etc. 
Regardless of which legal technique is adopted by the state, an indispensable 
condition of the application of international treaties within the state is that the text of the 
treaties has to be revealed to the public in one way or another. There are two possible 
ways for this: 
the promulgation of treaties, and 
the publication of treaties. 
Formally the promulgation of the rules of law is the last phase of law-making 40 
This is necessary mainly in such cases when the resolution of the legislative body is not, 
or is not always sufficient for passing the act (e.g. the head of state has a right of veto). 
In these cases it is essential to define the date of the "passing" of the act. This date is 
defined by promulgation. 41 However, if a single legislative body has the authority to 
pass a final resolution to make a certain law, the date of when the law is (can be) applied 
can be and is typically defined by the legislative body itself. In this case promulgation is 
but an authentic document of law-making. This authenticity, however, can also be 
guaranteed by publication. 
It follows from the above that as regards international treaties promulgation is not 
only an unnecessary but also an unacceptable technique for the domestic application of 
the rights and obligations arising from international treaties.42 The reason for this is that 
the ratification or the entry into force of the treaties in some other way (e.g. by 
signature) would suffice. 
40 Cf. Creifelds, C.: Rechtsvörterbuch, Munich, 1978. (5th Edition) pp. 890 and 1244. 
41 In this sense see Kovúcs, I.: Magyar államjog, Volume II. Szeged, 1978. 
42 Cf. Scelle, G.: Précis des droit des Gens. Principes et systematique. Paris, 1932, pp. 352 and 353. 
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As to the legal nature of ratification, it signifies not only the conclusion of the 
inter-state law-making process, but also the creation of rights and obligations concerning 
the state bodies or other subjects-at-law. Therefore in the case of international treaties 
the use of promulgation actually means a "double ratification" in such a way that the 
"second ratification" appears as unilateral "enactment", as there is no international 
public authority for promulgation.43 . 
On the other hand the publication of effective international treaties is by all 
means necessary so that — as in the case of all the other rules of law — their content can 
be learned about authentically and be applied. Therefore as to its legal nature, 
publication is but making the valid, effective rule of law known publicly. Therefore the 
publication of the rule of law or the international treaty has no effect whatsoever on their 
validity or execution. Thus formally, from the aspect of legal technique, it is the 
authentic publication of the rules of law — in this case of international treaties — in 
conformity with the local practice.44 
There are two logical ways for the publication of international treaties: 	. 
the text of the treaty is supplemented with a publication clause or preamble, 
and it is published formally as a domestic law in the official paper. This solution 
essentially means the use of transformation — be it named as such or not. 
Without any additional domestic source of law the authentic text .of the 
international treaties concluded by the state is published in the official paper (or in its 
supplement), if possible not only in the official language of the state but also • in the 
original, authentic language of the treaty. 
Ad c) If the legal technique of adoption is used, in theory the applicability of a 
given international legal norm in the domestic sphere does not necessitate any further 
state act. However, it is quite frequently encountered that the execution (application) of 
a given, concrete international legal norm within thé state can be realized only after 
special executory directions have been passed. At the same time it must be emphasized 
that not all the international treaties require executory, directions for their domestic 
application. International law may and does have certain rules which can be applied, 
executed in the domestic sphere without special executory directions. This possibility 
especially applies to international treaties containing direct rights for individuals (legal 
persons) or certain groups of people. Therefore if the state allows for the automatic 
incorporation of its international treaties into its legal order, for their application by the 
domestic jurisdictional bodies as direct sources of law, it is extremely important to 
decide whether or not the given international treaty or some concrete direction thereof 
necessitates a special executory direction. If this is not necessary, international treaties 
are qualified from the moment of coming into force as sources of law to be applied 
directly by domestic jurisdictional bodies, too. 
If, however, the execution of the rights and obligations contained in an 
international treaty requires the existence of further — domestic executory directions, 
the domestic application of the directions of the treaty must be preceded by passing the 
executory directions. This problem — manifested in execution and in jurisdiction — is of 
significance in those states which have opted for the use of the legal technique of 
43 In this sense see Guggenheim, P.: Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts. Volume I., Basel, 1949, pp. 37-38. 
44 In this sense see Bliscsenko, I. P.: International Treaties and Their Application on the Territory of 
the USSR, In: Americal Journal of International Law. 1975, p. 820. 
128 
adoption. Yet this difference, which is inherent in international treaties, must not be 
disregarded by the states with the practice of transformation either, as the passing of 
special executory directions may similarly be required or made unnecessary by the 
execution or application of the otherwise transformed international treaty. 
The above difference found in international treaties is expressed by the 
distinction of "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties. These technical terms, 
used both in the literature of law and in the practice of states, for the distinction of 
treaties have originated from the United States, which is explained by the fact that the 
possibility of the direct applicability of international treaties was accepted first in the 
United States, therefore it was the US courts which came up against the self-executing 
nature of a treaty for the first time (in 1829) in the Foster v. Neilson case.45 
In Europe it was after the Second World War that (by accepting the practice of 
adoption) the definition of the self-executing and/or non-self-executing nature of the 
treaties became a topical and important issue. 
The self-executing nature of an international treaty means that the treaty, on 
account of its content, the concrete character of the rights and obligations contained 
therein and its addressees, can be executed without any further domestic act in the 
sphere of domestic law. In the case of non-self-executing treaties the treaty can be 
executed only after the necessary executory directions have been passed. 
Although the content (and possibly the subject) and the addressees of a given 
international treaty are basic factors in deciding whether the treaty is self-executing or 
non-self-executing in nature, in reality the distiction is far from being so clear. It would 
be obvious, for example, to state prima vista that the European Convention on Human 
Rights is a self-executing treaty, as its addressees are basically individual persons 
(natural persons), who are also vested by the treaty with the right of complaint to the 
European Committee of Human Rights. Yet the Federal Council of Switzerland 
(Bundesrat) qualified Article 13 of the Convention as of double nature — and not without 
grounds — when it said: "The complainant is entitled to resort to the possibility or 
turning to forums of appeal within the state. This is provided as an irrevocable 
individual right by Article 13.46 There are no legal remedies, however, which would 
oblige the states to execute it..." 47 
In addition to the quoted Swiss example, the complexity of determining the self-
executing or non-self-executing nature is also illustrated by the the fact that more than a 
hundred years after the frequently quoted Foster v. Neilson case, the theoretical and 
practical debate on distinction has been revived in the United States, too. The legal cases 
inspiring these debates drew the attention to the question of the self-executing nature of 
treaties in Europe.48 
45 For the details of the case see Deák, F.: American International Law Cases, New York, 1971, 
Volume II. pp. 412-430. 
46 The authentic English text of Article 13 of the convention is the following:"Everyone whose 
rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convertion are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by person acting in an official 
capacity." (Act XXXI. of 1993, Magyar Közlöny, 1993 (41). 
47 Bericht des Bundeserates and die Bundesversammlung fiber die (Europaische) Konvention zum 
Schulze der Menschenrechte and Grundfreiheiten. Bundesblatt (Schweiz) 1968. II. p. 1074. 
48 For the discussion of the Sei Fuji v. State case particularly in the USA see among others the 
articles published in the American Journal of International Law: Fairman, Cf.C: Volume 46. (1952) pp. 
687-690; Hudson, M. O.: Volume 44. (1950) pp. 543-548; Wright, Q.: Volume 45 (1951) pp. 67-77. From 
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In the Foster v. Neilson case the basis of Judge Marshall's decision was that the 
treaty under debate created rights and obligations directly for the political power and not 
for the judicial power. 
However, the problem of distinction is much more complex and is the function of 
several factors, therefore Judge Marshall's reasons can serve as a guide-line only in that 
given case. The complexity of distinction and the necessity of considering several 
factors are also reflected in the jurisprudence of international law. In O'Connel's opinion 
the major difference between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is that the 
subject of the latter ones is a priori of political nature; such are certain customs items, 
the acquisition of property, the acquisition or surrender of land, and the issues related to 
the armed forces 49 
Muller from Switzerland takes another approach to the problem and examines 
whether the directions of the treaty concerning individual persons are concrete enough 
to be applied directly in a given case. 50 Öhlinger takes essentially the same stand, and 
he makes an attempt to give the exact definition of "directions concrete enough 
concerning individuals". According to his view self-executing treaties are the ones 
"which address one or more particular private persons, that is if on the basis of the 
international treaty a judicial judgement or administrative decision, with the general 
term an act is made, by means of which the legal relationships of private persons are 
formally implied, and which may reinforce already existing legal relationships or may 
create new legal relationships." 5 I 
Finally let me mention the approach taken by Evans, who claims that an 
international treaty can be regarded as self-executing if a rule of law is created by its 
own directions for the government (administrative) bodies, the courts, the states (that is 
for the member states of the United States — the author's remark) or for the individuals. 
On the other hand, non-self-executing treaties require, either in an explicit or in an 
implicit way, measures on the part of the executive or legislative bodies before they can 
become rules of law for the courts or for the individuals, too. 52 
In view of the — theoretical and practical — differences seen in the determination 
of the self-executing nature I cannot evade the task of trying to determine the self-
executing nature of a given international treaty so as to create sound bases for the direct 
applicability of international treaties in Hungary. 
First of all I would like to assert that I view the self-executing nature as an 
objective category, that is the self-executing nature of a treaty cannot depend on the 
intention of the parties to the treaty. In my opinion the parties' intention is relevant only 
inasmuch as in the case of such intention the parties to the treaty must pay special 
attention to ensure that the objective conditions of the self-executive nature are reflected 
in the content and in the text of the treaty. 
among the abundant European literature on the case see particularly: Bleckmann, A.: Begriff and Kriterien 
der innerstaatlichen Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtliche Vertrage. Berlin, 1970; and Öhlinger, Th.: Der 
völkerrechtliche Vertrag im staatlichen Recht. Wien—New York, 1973. 
49 O'Connell, D. P.: International Law (2nd Edition) Volume I, London, 1970, p. 65. 
50 Muller, J. P.: Völkerrecht and schweizerische Rechtsordnung. In: Handbuch des schweizerischen 
Aussenpolitic, Bern, 1975. p. 65. 
51 Öhlinger, Th.: Op. cit., p. 139. • 
52 Evans, A. E.: Self-Executing Treaties in the USA. In: British Year Book of International Law. 
Volume 30 (1953), p. 193. 	 . 
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As to the objective features: in my opinion the basic conditions of the direct (self-
executing) applicability of a certain international treaty can be defined according to the 
minimal criteria, the absence of any of which precludes the possibility of the self-
executive nature of a treaty. In my view these are the following: 
The domestic law of the contracting parties should not rule out the possibility 
of direct execution. 
The addressees of the treaties should be subjects-at-law which are or can be 
defined concretely (natural persons, legal persons, state bodies). 
The content of the treaty should be constituted by exactly determined rights 
and obligations. 
2. So the two main directions are represented by the constructions of 
dualism/transformation and monism/adoption. It must be emphasized that both 
constructions occur not only in theory, in jurisprudence, but also in the practice of the 
states, and both constructions may be used suitably for ensuring the full domestic 
application of the rights and the obligations originating from international law 
(international treaties). It must be similarly asserted that both constructions may and do 
work efficiently or on the contrary, very poorly. The reason is that the observation of 
legality as such is always the function of the will of the given state or power. 53 
In spite of the above my standpoint is unchanged and unequivocal: it is only the 
constitutional regulation based on the construction of monism/adoption which can be 
considered in the acceptance of our new constitution both on theoretical/dogmatic 
grounds and as a much simpler legal technique. 
The main reasons for my standpoint are the following: 
The generally accepted/recognized principles and norms of international law 
(that is the rules of universal customary international law), similarly to the other rules of 
customary law, cannot be transformed into the national legal order. Conceptually they 
can become part of a certain legal order only by means of adoption. 
The above is supported by the fact that the basic conceptual feature of 
transformation is that concrete rules of behaviour (or other rules) defined by 
international law (international treaties), that is concrete rights and obligations are 
changed (transformed) into a domestic source of law. Thus not only the formal source of 
law is changed but also the subjects-at-law, the addressees of the norm and the relation 
of the norm within the system (as co-ordination is replaced by subordination). 54 
Transformation is not only an unnecessary but also a definitely unjustified 
legislative act. It seems as if the process of law-making became complete through this. 
This is far from being true! The conclusion of the international treaty (e.g. ratification) 
makes the (international) law-making process complete and perfect. The subsequent 
transformation is qualified as a "second" or "double" law-making act, what is more in 
such a way that the validity of an international legal norm, which conceptually postulates 
the joint law-making of at least two states (or other subjects-at-law), is made to be the 
function of another, this time unilateral law-making act. 
The practice of transformation — as the international treaty has to be 
promulgated in a national source of law — creates an opportunity for the domestic law- 
53 See the example of the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece, where the transformed and 
promulgated international treaty. has priority over both.the former'and the newer. acts. 
54 Cf. Anzilotti: op. cit., p. 46. 
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makers to make -- unilateral decisions — using or omitting transformation — on the 
domestic . applicability of the international treaty which has been concluded perfectly 
with the participation of its own law-makers. 
The possibility of this decision in itself may question the good faith and 
seriousness of the international law-making intention — by all means so in the political 
sense. 
In the European Union (and to a certain extent in the European Council, too) 
there can be no question of whether the member states have transformed the treaties 
creating the Union, and the same applies to the decisions of the Union bodies invested 
with law-making authority (so-called secondary sources of law). 
The member states (including the countries opting for the practice of 
transformation, such as the founder FRG and Italy as well as the Scandinavian states and 
Ireland, which joined the Union later) are obliged to conform to the rules of the EU-law 
directly (that is without transformation) and to ensure their absolute priority over the 
national legal order. 55 
In theory the practice of dualism/ transformation gives the national law-makers 
a free hand to decide what domestic rank, as regards the source of law, the international 
treaty will be given. An international treaty promulgated by the government (and this is 
typical in the case of the so-called intergovernmental treaties) can hardly become a 
source of law higher in rank than a decree of the government in the domestic 
(Hungarian) hierarchy of the sources of law. 
At the same time, however, constitutionality requires that the directions of the 
higher-rank sources of law precede those of the lower-rank sources of law. Thus e.g. an 
international treaty promulgated in a decree of the government could be disregarded any 
time by passing a(n new) act. (Let me remark that this problem is actually encountered 
in our effective legal order.)56 
Finally let me mention that in addition to the foregoing theoretical/dogmatic 
problems there is also a pragmatic reason why the practice of transformation/dualism 
would not be expedient. It would take unnecessary time and energy in the course of the 
law-making process and would further slow down and delay the passing of important 
acts (and decrees). 	 . 
3. Conclusion: . 	 . 
in view of the theoretical-dogmatic considerations outlined in the present study, 
— following the European trend of the new constitutions of the recent decades, 
— considering the compulsory regulations and the decision-making mechanism of 
the European Union and the European Council, 
— acknowledging that the application of international law (international treaties) 
within the state as part of the legal order is the integral attribute of constitutionality, 
recognizing the additional practical advantages yielded by the legal technique, 
one can say that the direction of our new constitution on the relation of international 
law and domestic law has to be based on the construction of monism/adoption. 
55 See Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which founded the EEC. 	. 
56 Thus e.g. the Hungarian—West German bilateral convention on the elimination of double taxation 
was promulgated in a decree of the government. The contents thereof were totally contrasted sharply by the 
modification of the act on personal income tax for the year of 1994. Yet in the case of compliance with 
international treaties in good faith it is inconceivable to apply an act over the international treaty by referring 
to lex superior derogat legi inferiori. . 
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